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Abstract
In the United States, the employment rate is nearly at across wealth quintiles with the
exception of the rst quintile. Correlations between wealth and employment are close to zero
or moderately positive. However, incomplete markets models with a standard utility function
counterfactually generate a strongly negative relationship between wealth and employment. Us-
ing a fairly standard incomplete markets model calibrated to match the distribution of wealth, I
nd that government transfers and capital income taxation increase the (non-targeted) correla-
tions between wealth and employment substantially, bringing the model closer to the data. As
the models t with the distribution of wealth and employment improves, I nd that the precau-
tionary motive of labor supply is mitigated, thereby raising aggregate labor supply elasticities
substantially.
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1 Introduction
Several recent studies have shown that labor supply at the extensive margin is nearly at across
wealth quintiles in the United States.1 In fact, I nd that employment rates over wealth quintiles are
nearly at with the exception of the rst quintile in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data
set that has been recognized as one of the best data sets capturing a highly concentrated distribution
of wealth.2 Moreover, correlations between wealth and employment are close to zero or moderately
positive. However, these empirical facts are in sharp contrast to standard incomplete markets models
with a standard household preference since these models predict that the employment rate falls
sharply with wealth.3 Does this discrepancy imply that the degree of wealth e¤ects on extensive
margin labor supply, implied by the utility function commonly assumed in the macroeconomic
models, is not compatible with the data? Or, are there any missing factors in the standard model
that are crucial for this discrepancy?
The main goal of this paper is to explore the role of institutional factors such as government
transfers and capital income taxation in resolving this discrepancy while maintaining the standard
utility function. To this end, I develop a fairly standard incomplete markets model in which
consumption-savings and labor supply at the extensive margin are endogenous. The model economy
is calibrated to match the highly concentrated distribution of wealth in the SCF data in the spirit of
Castaneda, Diaz-Gimemez and Rios-Rull (2003) and Kindermann and Krueger (2016). Using the
model economy, I show that government transfers and capital income taxation are quantitatively
important in rendering the model much more consistent with the data in terms of non-targeted
statistics about the cross-sectional relationship between wealth and employment. Specically, the
rank correlation between wealth and employment implied by the model increases from  0:50 in
the standard version of the incomplete markets model to 0:14 in the baseline specication that
1See e.g., Chang and Kim (2007) and Ferriere and Navarro (2016) for the evidence in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics; and Mustre-del-Rio (2015) for the evidence in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Note that labor
supply at the extensive margin may represent employment or labor force participation decisions. This paper focuses
on the full-time employment margin, which is conceptually closer to labor supply in a class of macroeconomic models
considered in this paper. The empirical pattern documented herein is similar for labor force participation decisions
as well except for the rst wealth quintile.
2See e.g., Diaz-Gimenez, Glover, and Rios-Rull (2011); and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2015) for recent reviews that
describe various aspects of inequality in the U.S. using the SCF.
3Chang and Kim (2007), Mustre-del-Rio (2015) and Ferriere and Navarro (2016) show that the employment rate
strongly declines with wealth quintiles in their model with log utility for consumption and separable disutility of
work, the so-called KPR preference (King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988).
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incorporates both transfers and capital income taxation (much closer to 0:07 in the data). In
other words, the model is able to reconcile the weakly positive correlations between wealth and
employment with the standard utility function featuring reasonable income e¤ects, in the presence
of institutional features such as government transfers and capital income taxation.
The economic mechanisms behind the importance of transfers and capital income taxation in
resolving the discrepancy are straightforward. A key reason why the standard version of the incom-
plete markets model predicts a strongly negative rank correlation between wealth and employment
is that most of the wealth poor households counterfactually choose to work despite their low produc-
tivity. Note that households can self-insure against idiosyncratic productivity risk not only through
savings (Imrohoro¼glu, 1989; Huggett 1993; Aiyagari, 1994) but also through labor supply (Pijoan-
Mas, 2006; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2008, 2014). Transfers serve as an additional
insurance instrument, particularly for those who lack wealth accumulation and thus rely heavily
on labor supply for self-insurance. Therefore, the presence of government transfers signicantly
mitigates the strong precautionary motive of labor supply. As a result, the employment rate of the
rst wealth quintile becomes 60:2%, closer to 60:8% in the data. On the other hand, the strongly
negative correlation between wealth and employment is also because the employment rate of the
wealth rich is too low in the standard version of the incomplete markets model (42:0%) compared
to the data (72:3%). As wealth (and thus capital income) is heavily concentrated among the wealth
rich, the presence of capital income taxation disproportionately reduces the asset holdings of the
wealth rich, thereby promoting labor supply of these richer households through income e¤ects (re-
sulting in 71:3% in the baseline specication). Therefore, both transfers and capital taxation play
a quantitatively signicant role in mitigating the negative slope of employment rates according to
wealth.
In light of the quantitative success in better accounting for the distribution of wealth and
labor supply, I use the model to explore its implications for the aggregate labor supply elasticity.4
Note that, in an incomplete markets model with endogenous labor supply at the extensive margin
(e.g., Chang and Kim, 2006, 2007; and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson, 2010), it is the distribution
of households, not a single utility function parameter, which shapes the aggregate employment
4The aggregate labor supply elasticity is central to various questions in macroeconomics and related areas, ranging
from the e¢ ciency costs of taxation to business cycle uctuations. See e.g., King and Rebelo (1999), Keane (2011)
and Keane and Rogerson (2012) for literature reviews.
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response to wage changes. An important contribution has been made by Chang and Kim (2006)
who investigate the endogenous distribution of wealth as a determinant of the aggregate labor supply
elasticity. A contribution of this paper relative to this literature is to investigate the implications
of the joint distribution of wealth and labor supply for the aggregate labor supply elasticity.
For this purpose, the model economy with di¤erent specications is used to explore the impli-
cations for the aggregate labor supply elasticity. I consider two exercises. First, I study the e¤ects
of permanent labor income tax changes on labor supply, as in Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and
S¸ahin (2008, 2010). The quantitative analysis reveals that the aggregate labor supply elasticity,
induced by permanently higher labor taxes, is considerably larger when the model better replicates
the distribution of wealth and labor supply (0:42 in the baseline specication vs 0:24 in the standard
version of the model). The much higher aggregate labor supply elasticity in the baseline model
is largely driven by labor supply decisions of households with low productivity, whereas in the
standard version of the model, these households are much less sensitive to after-tax wage changes
due to the very strong precautionary motive of labor supply. The second exercise considers the
aggregate labor supply elasticity, based on the equilibrium distribution of reservation as in Chang
and Kim (2006).5 I nd that this aggregate labor supply elasticity in the baseline model is also
substantially higher in the baseline model (1:74) than in the standard version of the model (1:09).
These exercises highlight the importance of overturning the counterfactually negative relationship
between wealth and employment, since the model would substantially understate the magnitude of
aggregate labor supply elasticities.
The cross-sectional relationship between wealth and labor supply has received little attention
in the literature. The at (or weakly inverse U-shaped) employment rates across wealth quintiles
in the U.S. I nd using data from the SCF are broadly consistent with the existing evidence in
Chang and Kim (2007), Mustre-del-Rio (2015) and Ferriere and Navarro (2016) using di¤erent
data sets such as the NLSY and the PSID. In addition to the at prole of employment rates by
wealth quintiles, my paper also shows that correlations are close to zero or moderately positive
within various groups divided by gender, education, age and over time. This clearly demonstrates
the discrepancy between the data and standard incomplete markets models, the latter of which are
5As found by Chang and Kim (2006), the elasticity obtained in this way roughly corresponds to Frisch elasticity
for the hypothetical representative agent. As noted by Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2016), Frisch elasticity is not
a well-dened concept in incomplete markets with household heterogeneity.
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shown to generate strongly negative correlations.
Moreover, there has been almost no attention paid to the theoretical exploration of channels
a¤ecting the cross-sectional relationship between wealth and employment. Mustre-del-Rio (2015) is
one exception and examines this issue. Using a quantitative model with innitely-lived two-person
households, Mustre-del-Rio (2015) concludes that ex-ante heterogeneity in disutility of work across
gender and skills is key in reversing the counterfactual prediction of the model. In this paper,
I take an alternative approach in assuming that all households have the same preference, and
investigate the role of the observed government transfers and capital tax as key factors shaping the
cross-sectional relationship between wealth and labor supply.6
This paper builds on the literature that emphasizes the role of government transfers as an
insurance mechanism. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) show that social insurance in the form
of government transfers discourages precautionary saving, especially for low-income households. In
this paper, I highlight that the role of government transfers as social insurance extends to labor
supply decisions, reducing the precautionary motive of labor supply. Broadly speaking, my paper
is also related to the literature which emphasizes the role of transfers in a¤ecting labor supply and
in understanding macroeconomic aggregates, such as Floden and Linde (2001), Rogerson (2007),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010), and Oh and Reis (2012) among
others. It is worth noting that, although there are exisiting papers that consider transfers in a
model with endogenous employment such as Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) and Krusell et al.
(2010), they do not explicitly investigate how the existence of transfers shape the cross-sectional
relationship between wealth and labor supply, which is the focus of this paper.
Finally, note that there is a literature that highlights the correlation between wages and
intensive-margin hours as a way of measuring the degree of risk-sharing in the absence of com-
plete asset markets (Pijoan-Mas, 2006; and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2008, 2014). My
nding that transfers substantially increases correlations between wealth and employment is accom-
panied by a more positive correlation between productivity and employment. This demonstrates
6Mustre-del-Rio (2015) considers a form of transfers (minimum consumption) although it is not the main focus
of his paper. In addition to the apparent modeling di¤erence, a key di¤erence lies on the nature of the quantitative
exercise. Specically, transfers in my model are calibrated to be consistent with the data, but are not directly targeted
to match the wealth prole of employment. Therefore, the e¤ect of introducing government transfers on the wealth-
employment relationship is one of the non-targeted moments, and the evaluation of this e¤ect is one of the main
exercises in my paper. In contrast, the minimum consumption level in Mustre-del-Rio (2015) is directly targeted to
match the employment rate of men in the rst wealth quintile when the model is calibrated.
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that the key insight in this literature extends to my incomplete markets setting in which labor
supply at the extensive margin becomes more positively correlated with productivity (or wage
if households choose to work) in the presence of transfers which enhance self-insurance against
idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section documents the cross-sectional relationship
between wealth and employment using data from the SCF. Section 3 presents the environment of
the model economy. Section 4 explains how the model is calibrated across di¤erent specications.
Section 5 presents the main quantitative analysis regarding the distribution of wealth and labor
supply in the model compared to the data. I also briey discuss the e¤ects of alternative utility
specications. Section 6 explores the implications of better matching the cross-sectional relationship
between wealth and employment for the aggregate labor supply elasticity. Section 7 concludes.
2 Wealth and employment in the United States
The key statistics of interest in this paper regard the cross-sectional relationship between wealth
and employment. This section uses the 1992-2007 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
to document their relationship in the U.S. A distinguishing feature of the SCF is that it collects
detailed information about various household assets and liabilities, particularly of those who are at
the upper tail. Hence, the SCF is often recognized as one of the best household surveys to capture
a highly concentrated distribution of wealth in the U.S. The facts documented in this section are
based on pooled samples from the six waves of the SCF (1992-2007) whose age is between 18 and 70.7
Wealth is dened as the net worth, which is the sum of nancial and non-nancial asset holdings
minus total liabilities. Employment is a binary variable and takes the value of one if the household
heads the annual total hours worked is greater than 1,000 and the value of zero otherwise. In all
statistics, survey weights are used and dollar amounts are adjusted to 2013 dollars. More details
about data are available in Appendix.
Figure 1 plots employment rates by wealth quintiles in U.S. data. At rst glance, the prole
of employment rates seems quite at across wealth quintiles around the overall employment rate
7 I exclude households whose age is greater than 70 since it is less likely for them to use the labor supply margin
actively for various reasons (e.g., due to health). However, the key facts documented in this section are quite robust
to the inclusion of these samples.
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Figure 1: Participation rates by wealth quintiles in the US
Note: This gure is based on the 1992-2007 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. Survey weights are used and
wealth is adjusted for ination.
of 73:6%. A closer look reveals that it is weakly inverse U-shaped. Specically, the employment
rate of households in the rst wealth quintile is somewhat lower at 60:8%. On the other hand, the
employment rates in the second and the third quintiles are relatively higher at 77:9% and 78:7%,
respectively. Then, the employment rate declines weakly as we move toward richer households
(72:3% at the top wealth quintile). However, the overall shape of the employment rate across
wealth quintiles is nearly at, especially among households except the rst wealth quintile. This
relatively at prole I nd in the SCF data set is broadly consistent with the existing evidence
based on di¤erent data sets such as the NLSY and the PSID (Chang and Kim, 2007; Mustre-del-Rio
2015; and Ferriere and Navarro, 2016).
To quantitatively establish the relationship between wealth and employment, it is helpful to
present correlations between the two variables. Table 1 reports cross-sectional correlations between
wealth and employment using the same data set. In addition to the conventionally used Pearson
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Table 1: Correlations between wealth and employment
Spearman Pearson
Overall 0.07 -0.02
By gender
- Male 0.00 -0.04
- Female 0.12 -0.01
By education
- No college 0.07 -0.03
- Some college 0.02 -0.05
- College -0.07 -0.08
By age
- Young (29 or below) 0.22 0.03
- Middle (30-54) 0.24 0.03
- Old (55 or above) 0.10 0.01
By year
- 1992 0.07 -0.01
- 1995 0.07 -0.02
- 1998 0.05 -0.03
- 2001 0.06 -0.05
- 2004 0.05 -0.04
- 2007 0.07 -0.01
Note: Spearmans correlation is a nonparametric measure of statistical dependence between the ranking of wealth
and that of employment whereas Pearsons correlation captures the statistical dependence between the levels of the
two variables. The data source is the 1992-2007 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. Survey weights are used
and wealth is adjusted for ination.
correlation coe¢ cient that captures the strength of linearity, I also report Spearmans correlation
coe¢ cient that uses the rank of each variable instead of the level. Note that when wealth is
highly dispersed, Pearsons correlation is largely a¤ected by the wealth-rich whereas Spearmans
correlation is not.
The rst row of Table 1 reveals that Spearmans correlation is moderately positive at 0:07 and
Pearsons correlation is slightly negative ( 0:02). As highlighted in Introduction, the near-zero or
even moderately positive correlations in the data are at odds with standard incomplete markets
model with a standard household preference since the model would predict that correlations between
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wealth and employment are considerably negative.8
Table 1 also reports correlations within more disaggregated groups. First, it is interesting to
note that even within narrower groups divided by gender and education (as shown in the second to
sixth rows of Table 1), correlations between wealth and employment stay relatively close to zero.
The rank correlation (Spearman) between wealth and employment ranges from  0:07 (for college
graduates) to 0:12 (female), but they are mostly around zero in many di¤erent groups. Pearsons
correlations are in general more negative, but they are not far from zero. Note that both Spearman
and Pearson correlations are more positive among the low-education group whereas they are more
negative among the high-education group. This pattern should not be surprising given Figure 1;
which shows the weakly inverse U-shaped employment prole over wealth, the latter of which is
positively correlated with the education level.9
Interestingly, when correlations are computed within di¤erent age groups, the rank correlation
becomes more positive, ranging from 0:10 to 0:24.10 This, in fact, makes the discrepancy between
the model and the data even more puzzling since the standard model implies strongly negative
rank correlations. Finally, Table 1 also reports correlations for each year. Spearmans correlation
coe¢ cient ranges from 0:05 to 0:07 and Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient ranges from  0:05 to  0:01
over time. Therefore, these estimates clearly demonstrate that the correlations are very robust over
time.
3 Model economy
In this section, I describe the model economy that will be used (i) to illustrate the counterfactual
prediction of a standard incomplete markets model regarding the relationship between wealth and
employment; and (ii) to explore the role of transfers and capital income tax in rendering the model
more consistent with the data. It is a relatively standard incomplete markets general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous households in the tradition of Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994).
Several key features include uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks along with incomplete asset markets
8As I investigate in more detail in Section 5, my calibrated model representing a standard incomplete markets
model implies the Spearman and Pearson correlations of  0.50 and  0:20, respectively.
9The mean net worth among the college group (the some-college group) is 5.0 (1.7) times as large as that among
the no-college group.
10Nevertheless, the Pearson correlations within age groups are still relatively close to zero.
8
and borrowing constraints, which result in households precautionary savings for self-insurance.
Another key feature in the model economy considered in this paper is the endogenous labor supply at
the extensive margin (i.e., employment) (Chang and Kim, 2006). The model environment described
below is the baseline specication that incorporates government transfers and capital taxation. In
the following quantitative analysis, I will also consider alternative specications which are simply
nested specications of the baseline model to represent a standard version of the incomplete-markets
model.
Households:
The model economy is populated by a continuum of innitely-lived households. Since the
analysis in this paper is based on a stationary environment, I omit the time index and present the
households dynamic decision problem recursively. In each period, households are distinguished
by their net worth a and productivity xi: I assume that xi takes a nite number of values Nx
and follows a Markov chain with transition probabilities ij from the state i to the state j: The
competitive factor markets imply that households take as given the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of
labor w and the real interest rate r. The dynamic decision problem which each household faces in
each period is captured by the following discrete choice problem:
V (a; xi) = max [W (a; xi); N(a; xi)]
where W (a; xi) is the value of working and N(a; xi) is the value of non-working. Each of these
value functions are dened as
W (a; xi) = max
c0;a0>a;
8<:U(c; n) + 
NxX
j=1
ijV (a
0; x0j)
9=;
subject to c+ a0  (1   l)wxin+ (1 + r(1  k))a+ T (z) if a > 0 (1)
 (1   l)wxin+ (1 + r)a+ T (z) if a  0 (2)
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and
N(a; xi) = max
c0;a0>a;
8<:U(c; 0) + 
NxX
j=1
ijV (a
0; x0j)
9=;
subject to c+ a0  (1 + r(1  k))a+ T (z) if a > 0 (3)
 (1 + r)a+ T (z) if a  0; (4)
thereby making the whole problem as a functional equation for V (a; xi). In each case, households
maximize utility by choosing the optimal consumption c and asset holding for the next period
a0 conditional on the labor supply decision while taking into account the expected future valuePNx
j=1 ijV (a
0; x0j) discounted by a discount factor .
11
The budget constraint states that the sum of current consumption c and assets for the next pe-
riod a0 should be less than or equal to the available resources at the beginning of the current period,
as shown in (1)-(4). The available resources (i.e., the right-hand side of the budget constraints) de-
pend on the labor supply choice. When households choose to work, the available resources include
net-of-tax earnings (1    l)wxin; current asset holdings a; net-of-tax capital income (1   k)ra,
and government transfers T (z): T () is the nonlinear transfer schedule determinig the amount of
transfers as a function of z; which is the ratio of household income to output per capita.12 When
they choose not to work, the available resources exclude earnings. As shown in (2) and (4), when
a is non-positive, households are not subject to capital income taxation. Households can borrow
up to a borrowing limit a  0:
Finally, I assume that the period utility function follows
U(c; n) = log(c)   n: (5)
where   > 0 is the disutility of work as a parameter. Note that this utility function belongs to the
so-called KPR preference (King et al. 1988). The KPR preference is widely used in the applied
macroeconomics literature since it permits the balanced growth path with reasonably strong income
e¤ects.
11A variable with a prime denotes its value in the next period.
12Household income is the sum of earnings and capital income. Details on government transfers are described in
the description of government below.
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Government:
The government taxes labor earnings at the rate of  l and capital income at the rate of k. The
tax revenues are redistributed to households in the form of transfers. The U.S. transfers exhibit
progressivity, as discussed in Section 4. In the spirit of means-tested programs such as food stamps,
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF; formerly the Aid to Families with Dependent Children), the amount of transfers
is allowed to depend on household income using the following nonlinear transfer schedule:
T (z) = s(1 + z)
 p : (6)
where s and p are scal parameters and z denotes the ratio of household income (labor earnings
and capital income) to output per capita.13 The rst scal parameter s  0 denes the amount of
transfers for households with zero income (i.e., T (0) = s), and given p  0; the size of transfers
decreases weakly with household income. In this sense, s adjusts the scale of transfers, and p
captures the degree of progressivity. Note that for p = 0 the amount of transfers is independent
of household income, while for a larger value of p the amount of transfers would decrease faster
with household income. Although the above parametric form is simple, Section 4 shows that it
approximates the heterogeneity in the amount of transfers across income quintiles in the U.S. very
well.
The government purchase G is residually determined such that the government budget con-
straint is balanced. Since the role of government purchase on labor supply is out of scope of this
paper, I assume that G is either not valued by households or valued by households in an additively
separable manner.
Firm:
Aggregate output Y is produced by a representative rm. The rm maximizes its prot
max
K;L
fF (K;L)  (r + )K   wLg
13Heathcote et al. (2016) estimate the progressivity of the tax and transfer system jointly among the workers.
As noted by the authors, their parametric assumption imposes zero net transfers for those who have zero earnings.
Therefore, their tax and transfer system is not ideal for the framework considered in this paper wherein the focus is
on the extensive margin labor supply because no social insurance is provided to the wealth poor who do not work.
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where F (K;L) captures a standard neoclassical production technology in which K denotes aggre-
gate capital, L denotes aggregate e¢ ciency units of labor inputs, and  is the capital depreciation
rate. The aggregate production function is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas function with constant
returns to scale:
F (K;L) = KL1 :
The above optimization problem provides the factor demand for capital Kd and labor Ld sat-
isfying
r = F1(K
d; Ld)   (7)
w = F2(K
d; Ld): (8)
Equilibrium:
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a collection of factor prices r; w, equilib-
rium aggregate quantities K;L; the households decision rules g(a; xi), h(a; xi), government policies
 l; k; T (); G; value functions V (a; xi), W (a; xi); N(a; xi) and a probability measure of households
 over the state space such that
1. Given factor prices r; w and government policy  l; k; G; T (), the value functions V (a; xi),
W (a; xi); N(a; xi) solve the households decision problems dened above, and the associated
household decision rules are g(a; xi) and h(a; xi);
2. Given factor prices r; w, the rm optimally chooses the factor demands Kd and Ld following
(7) and (8);
3. Markets clear;
Z
g(a; xi)d = K
d = KZ
xih(a; xi)d = L
d = L;
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4. Government balances its budget:
G+
Z
T (z)d =  lwL+ kr
Z
I(a  0)g(a; xi)d
where I(a  0) is an indicator function being one if a  0 and zero otherwise;
5. The measure of households  over the state space is the xed point given the decision rules
and the stochastic processes governing xi.
4 Setting model parameters
The model is calibrated to U.S. data, based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). As in Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010), a
model period is set to one year. Note that the key ow statistics obtained from the data, such as the
hours worked and earnings, are based on the annual frequency.14 There are two sets of parameters.
The rst set of parameters is calibrated externally. These parameter values are xed across di¤erent
specications. The second set of parameters is calibrated to match the target statistics obtained
from the micro-level data. These parameter values are re-calibrated across di¤erent specications
so that the di¤erent specications are comparable to each other in terms of key macroeconomic
variables and the degree of inequality generated by the model. The model-implied statistics should
be obtained numerically since the model cannot be solved analytically. The equilibrium decision
rules and the value functions of households are computed using a standard nonlinear method.15
Before I discuss how the parameters are calibrated, it is necessary to specify the labor pro-
ductivity processes. Note that the literature has found that a standard incomplete markets model
requires extra features to replicate a very high degree of wealth inequality observed in the SCF.16
14Given the assumption on indivisible labor, I have experimented with a version of the model with a higher model
frequency (i.e., quarterly). The main results are quite robust, mainly because this paper focuses on long-run (steady-
state) questions. For short-run questions such as business cycle uctuations, it would be essential to have a higher
frequency in the model.
15Specically, I solve the decision rules and value functions on the grids of the state variables. Capital is a continuous
variable in the model is stored in 200 log-spaced grid points, and is interpolated using the cubic spline interpolation
when evaluating the expected future value. To approximate the distribution of capital (or wealth), I use a ner
log-spaced grid (with 2,000 grid points). The simulation results do not change quantitatively with a greater number
of grid points than these choices. More computational details are available upon request.
16See e.g., Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) for discussions on the observed wealth inequality across di¤erent
data sets.
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Such features include discount factor heterogeneity (Krusell and Smith, 1998), entrepreneurssav-
ings (Quadrini, 2000), a highly skewed productivity process (Castaneda et al., 2003) and voluntary
bequests (De Nardi, 2004) among others.17 To obtain an empirically reasonable distribution of
household wealth, I take an approach following Castaneda et al. (2003) and Kindermann and
Krueger (2016). The basic strategy is to augment a state of extraordinarily high productivity to
capture the upper tail of the earnings distribution as in the data, and to use it to endogenously
generate a highly concentrated distribution of wealth.
Specically, I assume that xi can take among eight values (i.e., Nx = 8): xi 2 fx1; :::; x8g
with x1 < x2 < ::: < x8: The rst seven values are considered as ordinary productivity states
while x8 is an exceptionally productive state. Then, fxig7i=1 and the transition probabilities among
these states, fxijg7i;j=1, are obtained as a discrete approximation of the AR(1) process following the
Rouwenhorst (1995) method with the persistence of x and the standard deviation of innovations x:
The 7 by 7 Markov transition matrix is then extended in a parsimonious way. First, I assume that
the highest productivity state x8 can be only reached from x7 with the probability of 78 = up.
Second, the probability of staying in the highest state x8 is given by 88 = 1   down and the
probabilities of falling down from x8 are equally distributed; that is, f8jg7j=1 = down=7. As
shown later, this marginal extension of the standard labor productivity process with three extra
parameters enhances the performance of model in replicating the distributions of earnings and
wealth in the SCF data.
Given the set of parameters described so far, I now discuss how these parameters are calibrated.
I begin with parameters that are externally calibrated. These parameters are commonly used in the
quantitative macroeconomics literature and are thus set independently of the model specication
settings. The rst parameter  in the aggregate production function is set to 0.36, consistent with
the capital share in the aggregate U.S. data. The annual capital depreciation rate  is equal to 0.096,
as is standard in the real business cycle literature. I set the hours of work n conditional on working
to 0.4, which would correspond to full-time hours of work. Regarding the ordinary productivity
process, I set x = 0:94, x = 0:205 as in Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010). Regarding the tax
rates for factor income, I follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) who construct the e¤ective income
tax rates based on Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) using the OECDs Revenue Statistics and
17See e.g., De Nardi (2015) for the survey of the literature on these features.
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Table 2: Parameter values chosen internally using simulation
Model
Parameter (a) (b) (c) (d) Description
  1.43 2.81 1.39 2.92 Disutility of work
 .963 .936 .950 .949 Discount factor
xs 54.1 46.6 53.8 47.3 High productivity state
up .00117 .0134 .00151 .00890 Prob of moving up to xs
down .00917 .0953 .0119 .0637 Prob of falling from xs
 .111 .0395 .109 .0410 Borrowing constraint
s .113 .115 Transfer scale
p 3.48 3.49 Transfer progressivity
Model restrictions: None s = 0 k = 0 s = 0
k = 0
National Accounts. Taking the averages over 1992 to 2007, the tax rate on labor earnings  l is set
equal to 0:279 and the tax rate on capital income k is set to 0:366.18
The second set of eight parameters are internally calibrated to match eight target statistics
in the data for each model specication. In addition to the baseline specication introduced in
the previous section (denoted as Model (a) henceforth), I consider three alternative specications.
These are nested versions of Model (a). Model (b) restricts transfers and the capital tax rate
to be zero (s = k = 0). This alternative specication serves as a benchmark environment
representing the standard incomplete-markets models that abstract from government transfers and
capital taxation.19 To disentangle the relative importance of transfers and capital income taxation,
Model (c) keeps transfers but shuts down capital income taxation (k = 0), and Model (d) maintains
capital income taxation but sets transfers to zero (s = 0).
Table 2 summarizes the eight parameters, the values of which are jointly determined by sim-
ulating the model for each specication. Specically, the calibrated values minimize the distance
between target statistics obtained from the data and those obtained from the model-generated
data. The rst parameter   determines the size of disutility of work. The relevant target is set as
the overall employment rate of 73:6% in the samples from the SCF. The next parameter  is the
18These tax rates are close to the values in Domeij and Heathcote (2004).
19 In the literature, it is quite common to abstract from government when it comes to study labor supply in an
incomplete markets framework (e.g., Chang and Kim, 2006, 2007; Domeij and Floden, 2006; Pijoan-Mas, 2006;
Chang, Kwon, Kim and Rogerson, 2014 among others).
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Table 3: Target statistics: model vs data
Model U.S.
Target statistics (a) (b) (c) (d) Data
Employment rate (%) 73.6 73.7 73.6 73.5 73.6
Steady-state interest rate (%) 4.00 4.00 3.99 3.99 4.00
Earnings share by top 1% (%) 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4
Earnings share by top 0.1% (%) 4.72 4.72 4.73 4.74 4.72
Wealth share by top 10% (%) 65.8 65.8 65.8 65.7 65.9
Wealth share by bottom 10% (%) -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41
Ratio of transfers to income (%) 4.92 - 4.94 - 4.93
Mean transfers by 1st income quintile 2.77 - 2.77 - 2.78
relative to unconditional mean
Model restrictions: None s = 0 k = 0 s = 0
k = 0
discount factor, and is calibrated to match the steady state real interest rate of 4%.
The next three parameters (i.e., xs; up; and down) are related to the extraordinary productiv-
ity. Recall that the essence of the calibration approach regarding these parameters is to generate
the realistic upper tail of wealth distribution through the top earners. Therefore, these parameters
are calibrated to match both the top earnings distribution and the top wealth distribution in the
SCF data. Specically, since the fraction of households at the extraordinary productivity state in
equilibrium is typically less than 0:1% when using this type of approach (e.g., Castaneda et al.,
2003; De Nardi, 2015), I choose the earnings share by top 1% and top 0.1% in addition to the share
of wealth by top 1% as the relevant target statistics for these parameters.
The borrowing limit a is linked to aggregate output per capita by assuming a =  Y . Then, 
captures the tightness of overall credit markets. The relevant target for  is chosen as the wealth
share by the households near the borrowing limit (i.e., the bottom 10%).
Finally, there are two scal parameters s and p regarding the nonlinear transfer schedule in
Model (a) and (c). Since s captures the scale of transfers, the ratio of transfers to income is used
as the target statistics for s: The household-level amount of transfers is based on a broad range
of government transfers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).20 Next, recall
that p measures the degree of progressivity in the amount of transfers. Therefore, the last target
20See Appendix for the detailed categories.
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Table 4: Earnings and wealth share, by quintile of each variable: data and model
Unit: % Earnings quintile Wealth quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
U.S. Data 0.6 7.4 14.4 23.2 54.6 -0.4 1.2 5.1 13.6 80.5
Model (a) 0.0 7.6 17.5 25.3 49.7 -0.7 0.6 5.0 13.6 81.4
Model (b): s = k = 0 0.0 6.0 15.1 24.9 53.9 -0.4 0.5 3.4 15.7 80.9
Model (c): k = 0 0.0 7.4 17.6 25.2 49.8 -0.7 0.3 4.8 13.5 82.1
Model (d): s = 0 0.0 5.9 15.0 25.2 54.0 -0.4 0.5 3.3 15.7 80.8
Note: The rst row for the U.S. is obtained from the authors calculations using data from the 1992-2007 waves of
the Survey of Consumer Finances.
statistic is set as the mean transfers among the rst income quintile relative to the unconditional
mean transfers. The above calibration strategy makes sure that the amount of transfers received
by the poor households in the model is in line with the data.
Table 3 shows that the model does a very good job of matching the target statistics in all of
the specications. The above calibration strategy also implies that all specications have the same
macroeconomic aggregate ratios such as the capital-to-output ratio (2:65) and the capital-to-labor
ratio (4:58). However, this does not necessarily mean that the di¤erent specications have the same
predictions along other non-targeted dimensions. Therefore, Table 4 and Table 5 present several
important non-targeted statistics regarding distributions of households under the di¤erent model
specications.
I begin by examining earnings distributions implied by di¤erent specications of the model
economy. In the left panel of Table 4, the share of earnings held by each quintile is reported.
Although the model is calibrated to match only the very top of the earnings distribution, the
model actually does a good job of accounting for the overall dispersion of earnings. For instance,
the share of earnings held by the top quintile is close to 50% in Model (a) and Model (c) and is
around 54% in Model (b) and Model (d). These are quite close to 54:6 percent in the data. The
model-implied share of earnings in the other quintiles are also broadly consistent with the data.
Table 4 also reports the share of wealth by wealth quintile both from the data and from the model
economy across di¤erent specications. Although the calibration only targets the bottom 10% and
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Table 5: Transfers by income quintile: models vs data
Unit: % Income quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
U.S. Data 2.78 0.95 0.62 0.38 0.27
Model (a) 2.77 1.14 0.60 0.35 0.14
Model (c): k = 0 2.77 1.13 0.60 0.36 0.14
Note: Reported values are the average transfers in each income quintile relative to the unconditional mean transfers.
U.S. data are based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
the very top of the wealth distribution, the model does a very good job of producing an endogenous
distribution of wealth, which is well in line with the data. Specically, in both the model and
the data, the rst two wealth quintiles hold a very tiny fraction of wealth of the overall economy
whereas the highest two wealth quintiles hold close to 95% of the total wealth of the economy.
Finally, note that Model (a) and Model (c) incorporate a nonlinear schedule of transfers which
is only targeted to match the unconditional mean transfers and the conditional mean transfers
among the rst income quintile. Given that a specic functional form is chosen to t the data, it
is interesting to check how the model performs in other income quintiles as well. To see this, Table
5 reports the conditional mean transfers by income quintiles relative to the unconditional mean
transfers. The rst row shows that a sizeable degree of heterogeneity in the amount of transfers
by income quintile in the U.S. For example, the mean transfers among the rst income quintile is
nearly three times as large as the unconditional mean transfers while the mean transfers among the
third quintile is about 60% of the unconditional average transfers. The second and third rows show
that the model with the simple functional form in (6) is able to match not only the targeted moment
for the rst quintile but also the overall shape of progressivity in the household-level transfers in
the data.
5 Quantitative analysis of wealth and employment
The exercises in the previous section suggest that the assumptions on institutional settings such as
transfers and capital taxation may not be crucial in matching the marginal distribution of wealth.
In this section, however, I show that these institutional factors are crucial when it comes to the
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(non-targeted) joint distribution of wealth and employment.21
I begin by presenting the key results on the role of transfers and capital income taxation in
rendering the prediction of standard incomplete markets models more consistent with the data
regarding the wealth-employment relationship. Figure 2 displays conditional employment rates by
wealth quintile implied by Model (a) that incorporates both transfers and capital income taxation
(blue dotted line) as well as Model (b) that shuts down transfers and capital income taxation
(red dashed line). I also present the data benchmark (green solid line) along with the model
results.22 First, note that Model (b) predicts that labor supply strongly declines with wealth,
which is consistent with the previous ndings using incomplete markets models (Chang and Kim,
2007; Mustre-del-Rio, 2015; and Ferriere and Navarro, 2016). This steep negative gradient is in
sharp contrast to what we observe in the data showing that labor supply behavior at the extensive
margin does not have a clear monotone relationship with wealth, as documented in Section 2.
A striking result to note in Figure 2 is that Model (a) does a great job of replicating the weakly
inverse U-shaped employment-wealth prole in the data. Specically, the employment rate among
the bottom wealth quintile in Model (a) is 60:2%, which is much closer to the data (60:8%). In
addition, the employment rate among the top wealth quintile is considerably higher (71:3%) in
Model (a), much closer to the data (72:3%) relative to a low employment rate of 42:0% implied by
Model (b).
Although the discrepancy in employment rates by wealth quintile in the data and in the model
has been discussed in the literature, one of the contributions of this paper is to document correlations
between wealth and employment. To this end, I compute both Spearman (rank-based) and Pearson
(level-based) correlations implied by the model, and compare them to the empirical counterpart in
the SCF data set. Table 6 summarizes these correlation estimates.
The third row of Table 6 reveals that both correlations implied by Model (b) are clearly negative.
These estimates reect the clearly negative relationship between employment rates and wealth in
Figure 2. In particular, the rank correlation (Spearman) between wealth and employment is  0:50,
which is obviously at odds with 0:07 of the data counterpart. Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient
in Model (b) is less negative ( 0:20) than the rank correlation although it is quite far from its
21Some quantitative results in this section require simulated data when the discretized equilibrium distributions
are not su¢ cient. These statistics are based on 500,000 households simulated using the model solutions.
22 In Appendix, Figure A1 plots the results from all model specications but without the data.
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Figure 2: Participation rates by wealth quintiles: models vs data
Note: Model (a), plotted with the blue dotted line, incorporates both transfers, nanced by labor income taxation,
and capital income taxation. Model (b), plotted with the red dashed line, restricts both transfers and the capital tax
rate to be zero. Both models are recalibrated to match the common targets including the unconditional employment
rate. The green solid line for the US is the same as the one in Figure 1.
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Table 6: Correlations between wealth and employment
Spearman Pearson
U.S. data 0.07 -0.02
Model (a) 0.14 -0.01
(+0.63) (+0.19)
Model (b): s = k = 0 -0.50 -0.20
Decomposition:
Model (c): With only transfers; k = 0 -0.08 -0.03
(+0.57) (+0.17)
Model (d): With only capital tax; s = 0 -0.46 -0.16
(+0.04) (+0.04)
Note: Spearmans correlation is a nonparametric measure of statistical dependence between the ranking of wealth
and that of employment whereas Pearsons correlation captures the statistical dependence between the levels of the
two variables. Numbers in parentheses are changes relative to the corresponding correlation in the standard version
of the incomplete markets model (i.e., Model (b)).
data counterpart ( 0:02). The second row of Table 6, which reports the correlations implied by
Model (a), clearly shows the quantitative success of improving the model-implied cross-sectional
relationship between wealth and employment. Specically, in Model (a), Spearmans correlation
turns into a positive number (0:14) and Pearsons correlation becomes very close to zero ( 0:01).
The natural question that follows is which element is quantitatively more important in bringing
the model closer to the data. To isolate the importance of each element for such quantitative success,
it is useful to consider the nested versions of the model that shut down each element separately.
Table 5 summarizes the result. Recall that Model (c) abstracts from capital taxation (k = 0)
but maintains government transfers. The fourth row of Table 5 shows that Model (c) increases
the correlations between wealth and employment quite substantially relative to Model (b). The
presence of transfers alone increases Pearsons correlation from  0:50 to  0:08 and the Spearman
correlation from  0:20 to  0:03. This suggests that the role of transfers in improving the models
prediction on the cross-sectional relationship between wealth and employment is quantitatively
substantial. Next, consider Model (d) which only incorporates capital income taxation and shuts
down transfers (s = 0). The last row of Table 5 shows that Model (d) moderately increases
Spearmans correlation to  0:46 and Pearsons correlation to  0:16, both of which are a bit closer
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to the data. This suggests that the capital tax rate does improve the model t but it is not as
powerful as government transfers in improving the cross-sectional relationship between wealth and
employment.
Inspecting the mechanism:
I now investigate the mechanism through which transfers and capital taxation a¤ect the cross-
sectional relationship between wealth and employment. Figure 3 illustrates the role of the presence
of transfers and capital taxation through Model (a) while holding the equilibrium prices constant.
Specically, the top panel of Figure 3 plots employment rates by wealth quintile in the cases when
the scale of transfers is reduced from s = 0:113 (dotted line) to 0:8 (dashed line) and 0:0 (solid
line). The bottom panel of Figure 3 plots the same statistics when the capital tax rate is reduced
from 36:6% (dotted line) to 19% (dashed line) and 10% (solid line). These exercises shut down
general equilibrium considerations by holding the equilibrium prices xed at the baseline level in
order to illustrate the partial e¤ects of each channel more clearly.
The top panel of Figure 3 clearly shows that a smaller scale of transfers increase the employment
rates across the whole distribution through income e¤ects on labor supply. More importantly, note
that this e¤ect is particularly stronger among the rst and second wealth quintiles. This substantial
change in the labor supply behavior of these households who hold relatively few asset holdings is
driven by heightened precautionary labor-supply motives. Since the wealth poor households lack
savings and are near the borrowing constraint, their consumption would become very low (especially
so in the absence of government transfers) if they choose not to work. It is important to note that
this concern for hitting zero consumption is relevant not only in the current period but also in the
near future periods since low productivity is expected to be persistent. This signicantly increases
their value of working relative to the value of not working, leading to a stronger incentive to work
even if their productivity (or market wage) is low. This is why the upper panel of Figure 3 shows
that the reduced amount of transfers induces more of the wealth poor households to work, thereby
making the relationship between employment and wealth more negative.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that a lower capital tax rate tends to reduce employment
rates across the whole distribution. Intuitively, a lower capital tax encourages capital accumulation,
which in turn discourages labor supply due to income e¤ects. More importantly, notice that the
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Figure 3: E¤ects of transfers and capital taxation on participation rates by wealth quintiles
(i) The role of transfers
(ii) The role of capital income taxation
Note: In the top panel, the size of transfers is reduced while holding equilibrium prices constant at the baseline level.
In the bottom panel, the capital tax rate is reduced while holding equilibrium prices constant at the baseline level.
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employment-wealth relationship becomes more negative when the capital tax rate approaches zero.
This is because the decline in the employment rate is more prominent for the richer households.
Since the distribution of wealth is highly concentrated (in both the model and the data), capital
income is also highly concentrated. When the capital income tax rate declines, the wealth rich, who
have a sizeable amount of capital income, benets more in terms of capital gains. This means that
the absence of capital taxation disproportionately encourages the savings decision of the wealth
rich, which in turn implies a stronger decrease in labor supply among the wealth rich through
income e¤ects. To sum up, capital income taxation works as a mechanism that helps overturn the
counterfactual negative relationship between wealth and employment through its disproportionate
impact on richer households.
I now present some empirical evidence that supports the above mechanism in the micro data.
Since it is hard to obtain micro-level data on capital income taxes, I focus on the relationship
between transfers and labor supply using the SIPP samples used in calibration. Table 7 reports the
cross-sectional relationship between transfers and employment in the total samples by estimating a
linear probability model.23 Note that there is a signicantly negative relationship between transfers
and employment ( :0000333) with a considerably high t-statistic (or equivalently a very small
standard error) in Column (1) of Table 7.24 Although this may not necessarily capture a causal e¤ect
of transfers on employment, it is interesting to note that this negative association still exists and
is quantitatively robust (ranging around  :00003) even after controlling for various characteristics
such as age, gender, race, and the number of children.
Since the theoretical mechanism highlighted above relies on a stronger e¤ect of transfers on
employment among the wealth poor households who are subject to a higher degree of precaution-
ary labor supply motives, it would be interesting to examine whether the negative relationship
systematically changes depending on the wealth level. Therefore, I estimate the specication (6) in
Table 7; by wealth quintile. Table 8 shows that it is indeed the case that the negative association
is strongest in the rst wealth quintile and its absolute value declines with the wealth quintile. For
instance, the strength of the negative association in the top wealth quintile ( :0000194) is less than
23Sampling weights and robust standard errors are used. The following results are robust when a logistic model is
used.
24Since many observations have zero values in both transfers and employment, I use the level instead of logged
values in the estimation.
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Table 7: Transfers and employment
Dependent variable: employment
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfers -.0000333 -.0000301 -.0000329 -.0000334 -.0000333 -.0000293
(-141.65) (-118.62) (-140.68) (-141.72) (-140.82) (-116.59)
Age -.0032118 -.0037246
(-39.54) (-45.31)
Gender -.1216502 -.125808
(-73.14) (-76.31)
Race -.0141515 -.012969
(-10.97) (-10.16)
No. children .0046345 -.0042329
(6.22) (-5.73)
R2 .169 .176 .188 .169 .169 .198
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors. A constant term is included in all
specications.
half of that in the bottom quintile ( :0000416). Although these are not necessarily causal e¤ects
but correlations, the monotonically weakening magnitude over wealth quintile appears to support
the above mechanism that government transfers have stronger e¤ects on labor supply among the
households with relatively lower wealth accumulation.
E¤ects of alternative preference specications:
The main focus of this paper is to investigate the role of potentially important factors that are
often missing while maintaining a standard utility function (King et al., 1988). Since one could
also conjecture that labor supply di¤erences across the distribution of wealth would be altered by
changing the preference specication, I briey consider the possibility of accounting for the cross-
sectional relationship between wealth and labor supply using alternative preference specications.
Consider the constant relative risk aversion utility function:
U(c; n) =
c1 
1      n:
The range of the empirical estimates of  (or the inverse of ; the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution) is quite wide. For example, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) and Guvenen
(2006) suggest that  ranges from 1 to 3 whereas some papers (e.g., Gruber, 2006) nd a relatively
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Table 8: Transfers and employment, by wealth quintile
Dependent variable: employment
By wealth quintile
Regressors 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Transfers -.0000416 -.0000369 -.0000292 -.0000246 -.0000194
(-51.13) (-43.02) (-50.50) (-46.90) (-50.70)
Age -.0035049 -.0031763 -.0060726 -.0068908 -.0085911
(-18.56) (-17.34) (-32.23) (-30.56) (-36.26)
Gender -.1163583 -.0965565 -.1051713 -.1089978 -.1454433
(-30.13) (-26.87) (-29.98) (-29.89) (-37.06)
Race -.0168261 -.000784 -.0092944 -.004156 .0068325
(-5.83) (-0.29) (-3.25) (-1.45) (2.44)
No. children .0094058 -.0013569 -.0093521 -.0137691 -.0187727
(5.43) (-0.83) (-6.32) (-8.03) (-10.33)
R2 .212 .184 .229 .233 .209
Note: Specication (6) in Table 8 is used for all regressions. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors. A constant term is included in all specications.
high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, thereby suggesting  < 1. Therefore, I consider two
alternative values of  (2=3 and 1:5) around 1, which is the benchmark preference specication (5).
Then, the model with alternative preference specications is re-calibrated to match the same target
statistics according to the calibration strategy in Section 4.25 Note that the underlying framework
used for this exercise is Model (b), which abstracts from both transfers and capital taxation.
Figure 4 summarizes the results. It plots the employment rates by wealth quintile for the case
with  = 2=3 (dotted line) and the case with  = 1:5 (dash-dot line). First, note that the model
with  = 2=3 generates a atter employment rates by wealth even without transfers and capital
taxation. The key feature of this specication is that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(1=) is higher at 1:5, which makes the observed cross-sectional income e¤ects on labor supply
appear weaker. However, it is worth noting that the model with  = 2=3 tends to reduce the
employment rates of the rst two quintiles quite uniformly. Thus, the model is still unable to
generate the fact that the employment rate of the rst wealth quintile is noticeably lower than that
among the second wealth quintile. This suggests that a stronger substitution e¤ect alone may not
be su¢ cient to explain the employment rates of the rst wealth quintile and thus the weakly inverse
25See the calibration results in Appendix.
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Figure 4: E¤ects of the risk aversion parameter on employment rates by wealth quintiles
U-shaped employment rates by wealth quintile. On the other hand, the case with  = 1:5 predicts
that the employment rate falls even more sharply with wealth because the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is lower at 2=3, which in turn makes income e¤ects relatively stronger. It is worth
noting that, since the key mechanism through which transfers and capital taxation alter the wealth-
employment relationship is the income e¤ect on labor supply, they should have a quantitatively
stronger role in resolving this counterfactually negative wealth-employment relationship in this
case, compared to the baseline case with  = 1.
6 Implications for the aggregate labor supply elasticity
The previous section has demonstrated that incorporating transfers and capital income taxation
into the standard incomplete markets model can substantially improve the counterfactually negative
association between wealth and employment. Although this nding per se is important for a better
understanding of incomplete markets models, this paper further asks the relevance of matching
the observed employment rates by wealth in terms of the aggregate labor supply elasticity. This
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Table 9: Aggregate employment rate with respect to labor income tax changes
Labor income tax rate  l
0:279 0:315 0:351 0:387 0:423 0:459 0:495
Model (a) 100.0 98.1 95.9 94.0 91.7 89.1 86.0
Model (b): s = k = 0 100.0 99.0 97.8 96.5 95.0 93.3 91.7
Model (c): k = 0 100.0 98.0 95.9 93.4 90.6 88.7 85.2
Model (d): s = 0 100.0 98.0 96.7 95.5 94.1 92.6 91.1
Note: Aggregate hours are normalized to 100 at the baseline labor income tax rate of 27.9 percent in each specication.
is particularly relevant since Chang and Kim (2006) have shown that the aggregate labor supply
elasticity in this class of models is endogenously determined by the distribution of wealth.
I consider two exercises to investigate the implications for the aggregate labor supply elasticity.
The rst exercise considers the aggregate e¤ects of permanent labor tax changes (see e.g., Krusell,
Mukoyama, Rogerson and S¸ahin, 2008, 2010; and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson, 2010). I choose the
counterfactual tax rates such that the net-of-tax rate (1   l) is reduced by 5,10; 15; :: and 30%:26
The upper limit of tax rates is chosen to be 49:5%, which leads to a decline of the net-of-tax rate by
30%. This tax rate is very close to the recent labor income tax rates in some continental European
countries such as France and Italy, based on Mendoza et al. (1994)s method. In this experiment,
I control the transfer-to-output ratio at the benchmark level with the tax rate of 27:9% for each
specication.27
Table 9 summarizes the general equilibrium e¤ects of permanent labor income tax changes on
the aggregate employment rate across di¤erent specications considered in Section 5. Note that the
key mechanism of this paper relies on the interaction between public and self-insurance. General
equilibrium allows for endogenous changes in the prices (interest rates as well as wages), which
a¤ect these interactions. The reported values are expressed relative to the case with the labor
income tax rate of 27:9% that is normalized to 100.
26This allows me to easily infer the labor supply elasticity (i.e., the percentage change in the aggregate employment
rate with respect to a one percentage change in the net-of-tax rate). The resulting set of counterfactual labor tax
rates is f0:315; 0:351; 0:387; 0:423; 0:459; 0:495g.
27This is because the size of transfers would endogenously change when the labor income tax rate varies under the
assumption of the balanced government budget constraint. This would generate additional forces that amplify the
e¤ects of tax changes, which would not exist in the absence of transfers. In order to focus on the role of transfers
in shaping the distribution of wealth and employment not in amplifying the employment e¤ects of taxes, I thus hold
constant the size of transfers relative to output when the labor income tax changes, and assume that the additional
tax revenue, if any, is spent as G.
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An interesting result emerges in Table 9. Comparing the rst two rows, the same labor income
tax changes lead to strikingly di¤erent aggregate labor supply responses. Specically, when labor
taxes are increased from 27:9% to 49:5% (as in France or Italy), Model (a) predicts that the
employment rate would decrease by 14:0%. This drop is substantially larger than a 8:3% fall,
implied by Model (b). The results from the other specications, Model (c) and Model (d), in
the last two rows reveal that the presence of transfers amplies the fall in aggregate employment
signicantly while the presence of capital taxation mitigates it marginally.
To facilitate the comparison of responsiveness to tax changes, Figure 5 plots the implied labor
supply elasticity with respect to permanent tax changes, by the net-of-tax rate variations.28 In both
models, a larger variation of taxes implies a greater labor supply elasticity, showing nonlinearity
in the model economy. More importantly, the gap between the blue dotted line (Model (a)) and
the red dashed line (Model (b)) clearly shows that di¤erences in the estimates of the aggregate
labor supply elasticities between the two models are quite substantial. Specically, labor supply
elasticities implied by Model (a) range from 0:38 to 0:46 and those implied by Model (b) ranges
from 0:21 to 0:28. If I compute the average of these elasticities within the tax variations considered
herein, the aggregate labor supply elasticity implied by Model (a) is 0:42, which is roughly 72%
greater than the elasticity of 0:24 implied by Model (b).29
To understand the source of such a large discrepancy in the aggregate elasticity, it is instructive
to look at labor supply behavior across the distribution of households. The rst panel of Figure 6
summarizes how the employment rate in Model (a) with the baseline tax rate of 27:9% (solid line)
changes when  l increases, while the third panel shows the same statistics in Model (b). Note that
when tax changes, the marginal distribution of wealth in equilibrium changes but the invariant
marginal distribution of productivity does not (as shown in the second and fourth panel for Model
(a) and Model (b), respectively).
Figure 6 reveals important ndings. First, the two models have very di¤erent implications for
the type of workers who choose to work at the baseline tax rate of 27:9%. More precisely, Model (a),
which implies a more positive relationship between employment and wealth, shows that households
28Specically, the labor supply elasticity plotted in Figure 5 is obtained by the percentage change in aggregate
employment divided by the percentage change in the net-of-tax rate (1   l).
29The meta-analysis in Chetty et al. (2012) nds that the steady state (Hicksian) elasticity for aggregate hours is
0:58.
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Figure 5: Aggregate labor supply elasticity, by permanent net-of-tax rate variations
with higher productivity are considerably more likely to work. This positive relationship between
productivity and employment is in sharp contrast to the V-shaped relationship in Model (b).
Recall that when the model does not incorporate transfers as in Model (b), precautionary motives
induce many of the wealth-poor households to work despite their low productivity. Therefore, we
can see that the precautionary motive of labor supply overturns the positive relationship between
productivity and employment among the households with relatively low productivity who tend to
be wealth poor as well.30
Second, the precautionary motive of labor supply also a¤ects the labor supply elasticity of the
households, especially those who have low productivity. To see this point more clearly, Figure 7
plots the percentage point changes in employment instead of the employment levels in Figure 6. A
clear pattern, both in Model (a) and Model (b), is that the labor supply of households with lower
30This nding is in line with the literature (Pijoan-Mas, 2006; and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2008,
2014) highlighting the correlation between wages and intensive-margin hours to measure the degree of risk-sharing in
the presence of incomplete markets.
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productivity tends to be more elastic to permanent tax changes.31 This implies that the aggregate
labor supply elasticity is largely shaped by the responsiveness of low productivity households.
However, there is a large di¤erence in the degree of the responsiveness. Specically, in the presence
of transfers as in Model (a), households with relatively low productivity are substantially more
responsive to the same percentage change in the net-of-tax rate than in Model (b) that abstracts
from transfers. As the households have to rely heavily on labor supply for self-insurance in the
absence of government transfers, they are less likely to be responsive to the permanent tax changes
in Model (b).
Another way to investigate the model-implied labor supply elasticity is to utilize the reservation
wage distribution (Chang and Kim, 2006). More precisely, once the reservation wage is calculated
for each individual in the economy, the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of reservation
wages provides an aggregate labor supply schedule. Chang and Kim (2006) derives an aggregate
labor supply elasticity from the slope of the aggregate labor supply curves around the current
employment rate. They note that the elasticity obtained using this methodology should be viewed
as an upper bound for the aggregate labor supply elasticity since the distribution of wealth is held
constant in this exercise.32
Figure 8 shows the aggregate labor supply curves in Model (a) (blue solid line) and Model (b)
(red dashed line) constructed in this way.33 A quick look at Figure 8 shows that the aggregate
labor supply curve in Model (a) is generally atter than that in Model (b), suggesting that the
aggregate labor supply elasticity should be larger in Model (a). More precisely, using 5 percent
variations around the employment rate of 73:6 percent, Model (b) delivers the elasticity of 1:09,
which is well in the range of the elasticities of 0.94 and 1.12 in Chang and Kim (2006). However,
the elasticity obtained in Model (a) is 1:74, which is considerably larger than 1:09 in the standard
version of the model. Note that this result is consistent with the above nding that aggregate hours
respond much more strongly to permanent tax changes in Model (a) relative to Model (b).
Interestingly, in a related paper, Mustre-del-Rio (2015) nds that introducing minimum con-
31Note that employment rate of households with the lowest two productivity levels in Model (a) is already zero at
the baseline tax rate. This leads to zero employment responses to higher taxes.
32They indeed nd that the elasticities obtained in this way are quite similar to the Frisch elasticity based on the
model-generated aggregate data through the lens of the representative-agent model.
33The gure excludes the top 1% of the reservation wage distributions since they are substantially higher, which
would make it hard to compare the two curves.
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Figure 6: Employment rates by (log) productivity
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Figure 7: Employment changes by (log) productivity
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Figure 8: Reservation wage and employment rates in Model (a) and Model (b)
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Note: The gure is constructed as the inverse cumulative distribution function of reservation wages in each economy.
Wages are relative to the mean worker wage in the corresponding economy.
sumption (a form of transfers) reduces the aggregate labor supply elasticity substantially (in Table
8, Mustre-del-Rio, 2015). Hence, my results that the presence of transfers substantially increases
labor supply elasticities may seem contradictory to his result. There are at least two possibilities
that can explain the di¤erence. The rst is that transfers in Mustre-del-Rio are modeled as min-
imum consumption. When the size of minimum consumption is held xed (as a parameter), an
exogenous increase in wages inevitably reduces the (relative) degree of social insurance. According
to my result, a lower degree of social insurance leads to less elastic employment decisions due to
stronger precautionary motives. A related nding can be also seen in Domeij and Floden (2006)
who show that the intensive margin labor supply elasticity can be attenuated near the borrowing
constraint. My result is consistent with and is a natural extension of Domeij and Flodens result
in the sense that mitigating the lack of self-insurance with government transfers makes the poor
households who are near the borrowing constraint more elastic in their extensive margin labor
supply decisions.
Another notable di¤erence between Mustre-del-Rio (2015) and my paper is the characteristics
of samples used for the quantitative analysis. Mustre-del-Rios analysis is based on the prime-aged
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single cohort using the NLSY, which limits wealth dispersion. Furthermore, due to some properties
of the NLSY survey such as top-coding, wealth concentration is further limited. In contrast, the
samples using the SCF and SIPP in the current paper cover a more representative population. As
a result, there are considerably more households with low wealth in addition to a much higher
wealth concentration at the top. These characteristics of wealth distribution are an important
determinant of the strengths of precautionary motives, which in turn are important for the labor
supply elasticity results.
To sum up, the exercises in this section clearly show that the aggregate labor supply elasticity
is considerably higher in Model (a) than in Model (b). The results highlight that improving the
t of the model with the cross-sectional relationship between wealth and employment matters not
only for distributional properties in stationary environments, but also for the comparative static
behavior of the model economy.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have documented that employment rates are weakly U-shaped across wealth quin-
tiles, and wealth and employment are nearly uncorrelated (in level) or moderately positive (in rank),
according to the SCF. In contrast to these facts in U.S. data, I have shown that the wealth gradient
of employment rates is clearly negative and the correlations between wealth and employment are
considerably negative in standard incomplete markets models. To explore the role of transfers and
capital income taxation in resolving this discrepancy, I have constructed an incomplete markets
models with di¤erent institutional settings and found that government transfers and capital in-
come taxation are quantitatively signicant in resolving the counterfactually negative correlations
between wealth and employment. Further, I have shown that when the t of the model with the
distribution of wealth and employment improves, the aggregate labor supply elasticity implied by
the model increases substantially, mainly driven by the mitigated precautionary motives of labor
supply among the low productivity households.
A key mechanism of this paper that brings the model closer to the data is the insurance role of
transfers for those who have few asset holdings. In this regard, it is worth noting that this paper
abstracts from the insurance role of other potentially important factors such as spousal labor supply
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(Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos, 2005) or the intensive margin of labor supply (Pijoan-Mas,
2006; Heathcote et al., 2008, 2014). It would be interesting to consider the role of family as an
additional insurance mechanism that may interact with government policy and study which factor
is quantitatively most relevant. In addition, as shown by Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), Chang
et al. (2014), and Erosa et al. (2016), a model with both intensive and extensive margins can
introduce a non-trivial interaction between the two margins of labor supply. These potentially
important investigations are left for future work.
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A Data
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a triennial cross-sectional survey on the representative
U.S. households. To construct the main data set that are used to compute statistics, I pool the
samples in the following waves: 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007. I consider households with
both male heads and female heads. Given the focus of this paper (i.e., wealth and labor supply
at the extensive margin), it is important to keep the samples who are near retirement and are
recently retired. This is not only because the old population constitutes a relatively large fraction
of the wealth rich but also because retirement is also an important extensive margin labor supply
decision. Nevertheless, I drop the samples whose age is greater than 70 since their decisions might
depend on not only economic conditions but also on the health status. Next, I drop the samples
who are self-employed. When pooling the data, all dollar variables are ination-adjusted to 2013
dollars. For all statistics reported, I use weights provided by the SCF.
To construct earnings and wealth variables, I closely follow the denitions in Diaz, Glover and
Rios-Rull (2011) and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2015). Specically, the variable of earnings is dened
as wages and salaries of all kinds plus the 86 percent of the business income such as income
from professional practices, businesses, and farm sources. Wealth is dened as the net worth of a
household. In other words, it is the value of nancial real assets of all kinds minus the value of all
kinds of liabilities. See Diaz et al. (2011) and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2015) for details about various
sub-categories of assets and liabilities that are extensively covered in the SCF data set.
To construct an employment variable, I use the household heads annual total hours of worked.
The annual total hours of worked is constructed as the product of the hours worked per week and the
number of work weeks. The statistics in the papers are based on the threshold value of 1000 hours
for someone to be dened as employed. The threshold value changes the average employment rate,
but does not alter the cross-sectional relationship between wealth and labor supply signicantly.
The household-level transfer is obtained from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). It contains rich information on various transfers. The samples considered are from the rst
to ninth waves of the SIPP in 2001, which covers from 2001 to 2003. The same age restrictions are
used as above. The number of observations used for the empirical analysis is 257; 335. The amount
of transfers at the household level is computed as the sum of various transfer programs including
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Table A1: Parameter values and target statistics
Calibrated values Target statistics
Parameter  = 2=3  = 1:5 Target statistics (unit: %)  = 2=3  = 1:5 Data
  1.67 4.95 Employment rate 73.6 73.6 73.6
 .944 .930 Steady-state interest rate 4.00 4.00 4.0
xs 50.9 43.3 Earnings share by top 1% 12.6 12.4 12.4
up .0393 .0252 Earnings share by top 0.1% 4.71 4.71 4.72
down .257 .0535 Wealth share by top 10% 63.9 65.9 65.9
 .121 .0434 Wealth share by bottom 10% -0.41 -0.41 -0.41
Table A2: Earnings and Wealth share, by quintiles of each variable: data and model
Unit: % Earnings quintile Wealth quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
U.S. Data 0.6 7.4 14.4 23.2 54.6 -0.4 1.2 5.1 13.6 80.5
Model (b)  = 2=3 0.0 6.5 16.9 25.6 51.0 0.6 1.0 5.7 14.1 79.8
Model (b)  = 1:5 0.0 6.2 15.1 24.3 54.3 -0.4 0.1 2.4 15.1 82.9
Note: The rst row for the U.S. is obtained from the authors calculations using data from the 1992-2007 waves of
the Survey of Consumer Finances.
the Supplemental Security Income, the Temporary Assistant for Needy Families, the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, the Supplemental Nutrition for Women, Infants, and Children,
Social Security, childcare subsidy, Medicaid, and Medicare. Household income is computed as the
sum of labor income and capital income such as income from nancial investment, and property
income. All dollar values are ination adjusted.
B More on calibration
Table A1 reports the calibrated values for the models with di¤erent values of  around 1: Recall
that Model (b) without transfers and capital taxation is used as the underlying framework. Table
A2 reports the performance of these models in terms of earnings and wealth distributions.
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Figure A1: Participation rates by wealth quintiles: models vs data
Note: Model (a), plotted with the blue dotted line, incorporates both transfers, nanced by labor income taxation,
and capital income taxation. Model (b), plotted with the red dashed line, restricts both transfers and the capital tax
rate to be zero. Model (c), plotted with the orange dash-dot line, abstracts from capital taxation only. Model (d),
plotted with the purple line, shuts down transfers only. All models are recalibrated to match the common targets
including the unconditional employment rate.
C Additional gure
Figure A1 augments Figure 2 by plotting the employment rates by wealth quintile in all model
specications.
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